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Abstract
We study how to promote compliance with rules in everyday situations. Hav-
ing access to unique data on the universe of users of all public libraries in
Barcelona, we test the eect of sending email messages with dierent contents.
We nd that users return their items earlier if asked to do so in a simple email.
Emails reminding users of the penalties associated with late returns are more ef-
fective than emails with only a generic reminder. We nd dierential treatment
eects by user types. The characteristics we analyze are previous compliance,
gender, age, and nationality.
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11 Introduction
Understanding compliance with rules is crucial for modern societies. No matter whether
we talk about littering on the streets, picking up children from the kindergarten on
time, or appropriate behavior in public places like metros or libraries, learning about
eective tools for promoting compliance with rules is of obvious importance. While
economists would naturally think about monetary incentives, it has been found that
they may backre (see Benabou and Tirole, 2003 and 2006, for theoretical arguments;
Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000, and Mellstroem and Johannesson, 2008, for empirical
studies), or that they are not feasible due to political and institutional restrictions.
Therefore, it is crucial to understand whether there are other possible ways to promote
compliance with rules. The goal of this paper is to analyze the eect of conveying
various types of messages, in our case by email. Our interest in the potential eects
of sending messages is that it oers a virtually costless and non-invasive intervention
mechanism that is simple to implement and very exible for our, as well as for other
applications. Surprisingly, despite the advantages of this message intervention, little is
known about its eectiveness.
The setting that allows us to study compliance with rules on a large scale is the
Network of Public Libraries in the city of Barcelona. The type of compliant behavior
we analyze is whether users of the libraries return the items they borrowed on time.
A user not returning an item by the due date is violating the rule, and generating a
negative externality on the population of users. We evaluate whether we can get users
to return the items they borrow earlier; by means of dierent email contents that are
randomly allocated.
Our study will be informative for the optimal design of message contents in any
setting where compliance with rules is desired. As an illustration, in many countries,
the driving authorities convey messages to drivers by way of electronic panels in the
roads, with the aim of promoting careful driving. Such messages, for example, include
reminders of the penalties associated with breaking driving rules, or reminders of the
possible impact of one's behavior on others. However, the eect of these messages
is, to the best of our knowledge, unknown. The study of the behavior of library
users contingent on dierent message contents will improve our understanding on the
eectiveness of such a mechanism, and serve as a basis for the design of future message
2interventions in other settings of interest.
There are important characteristics that make our study unique. First, we observe
the behavior of all users of all public libraries in Barcelona over eleven months. During
this time span, there were about 50,000 dierent users, who borrowed over a million
items in the 32 dierent libraries spread throughout the city of Barcelona. Therefore, we
have data on a large number of individuals, in a daily-life situation, taking part in their
natural environment, and over an extended period of time. Second, we observe every
borrowing-returning transaction of items made by users. This allows us to measure
compliant behavior with exact precision. In other words, we are able to determine
precisely when individuals conform with the rule and when they violate it, and if so,
how severe these violations are. Third, the rules that govern the interaction between the
users and the libraries are simple and well-dened. In particular, the penalty associated
with returning an item late does not involve any monetary nes, but the exclusion from
the possibility of borrowing more items for a time period equal to the number of days
the item is overdue. Finally, the rich data on users oers a unique opportunity to test
for dierential treatment eects depending on important demographic variables, such
as gender, age and nationality.
We randomize all users into groups receiving one of ve dierent email messages,
and study their behavior after receiving the email. One of the ve email messages is a
Control message that provides a link to the webpage of the Network of Libraries.1
All the remaining messages add content to the text in Control. The rst treatment
message, called Reminder, represents a general reminder of the users' duty to return
the borrowed items on time. The second message, Social, adds to Reminder an
appeal to the eect individual behavior can have on the overall functioning of the public
library services, besides pointing out its importance. The last two email treatments,
Late and Penalty, are targeted only at those users who have recently returned at
least one item late. Both Late and Penalty add to Reminder the identication of
the user as having recently returned items late. Finally, Penalty builds on Late and
adds a reminder of the penalty associated with non-compliant behavior.
These email treatments allow us to evaluate the impact of dierent message contents
1The idea is that by comparing the eect of the treatment messages relative to the control, we are
able to dierentiate between the eect of the content of a treatment message and that of just getting
an email from the Network of Libraries.
3on users' behavior. Reminder is a clear call to the duty of users to comply with
the rule. Social adds a justication to the users' duty that appeals to the social
good aspect of the Public Libraries. Late identies users as non-compliants and
Penalty points to the private consequences of being late. Therefore, we can test
whether contents appealing to the social problem of returning an item late are more
eective than a generic reminder to return the borrowed items on time, or, similarly,
whether being identied in an email as a recent non-complier is more eective than a
generic reminder.
Given our design, we study the eect of email treatments on all users, independent
of whether they were initially complying with the rule or not, by comparing Control,
Reminder and Social; and the eect on previous non-compliers by comparing Con-
trol, Reminder, Social, Late and Penalty. Note also that we send messages to
all users who have been using the library services, independent of whether they have
an item or not borrowed at the time of the intervention. We chose so in order to to
be as general as possible in our design. Clearly, if the message intervention not only
aects current, but also future users, its impact is more far-reaching.
In our analysis we evaluate the eect of emails on the proportion of late returned
items by user, and on the number of days that elapse between the return date and the
due date. The rst variable measures the propensity to comply with the rule, while
the second variable measures the positive/negative externality that is imposed on other
users when a user returns the item earlier/later than the due date.
Our main result is that compliant behavior can be promoted by sending a simple
email. All emails signicantly reduce both, the proportion of late returned items, and
the number of days between the return date and the due date. The greatest eect
comes from the Penalty treatment, reducing the proportion of late returned items
by 10 percent, which has a signicantly greater eect than the 5 percent reduction
of the general Reminder. The eects are not only statistically signicant but also
economically relevant, especially in light of the negligible costs associated with the
intervention.
As for the eectiveness over time, we show that the eect of getting one of these
emails is short-term; the eect is signicant during the rst month after the email
intervention, but not afterwards. However, the eect is reproduced when the same
email is received for a second time, in our case two and a half months later. As such,
4our results suggest that sending multiple emails can help to keep compliance high.
Our data also allow us to study the eects on behavior by user-type. Regarding
previous compliance, we nd that users with a higher proportion of late returns in the
pre-treatment period react more strongly than users with a lower proportion of late
returns. Interestingly, even the \good citizens" react positively to receiving an email.
Hence, the email treatment is more eective precisely with those users whose compli-
ance prior to the treatment was lower, and, importantly, does not generate crowding-
out eects in those users that were complying with the rule before the intervention. We
also nd dierent eects by age groups. For example, we show that users under the age
of 20 do not react to any email content in terms of the proportion of late items per user,
while users in the age classes 20 to 40 and 40 to 60 are generally responsive to receiving
the emails. Users between 40 and 60, and over 60 seem to react mainly with regard to
the Penalty treatment. With respect to gender, our results show that there are no
signicant dierences in reactions to the treatments between women and men. Finally,
there are wide variations that depend on the users' nationality. We study reactions
of users from Spain, Northern-Central Europe, Western and Southern Europe, English
speaking countries (UK, USA, CA), East Europe and Russia, Latin America and Asia.
Interestingly, only Spaniards, people from English speaking countries and Asians react
to the emails. We then evaluate whether Asians or citizens of English speaking coun-
tries react dierently to the treatments than Spaniards do. Here, we see that users
from English speaking or Asian countries react much more strongly than Spaniards.
For example, Spaniards reduce their propensity to be late by 10 percent after having
received a Penalty message, while citizens from English speaking countries reduce
their propensity to be late by 43 percent for the same message type.
Our results relate to dierent strands of literature. Most directly, our study ts
into the growing literature on how to promote pro-social behavior and compliance with
rules.2 There is evidence that visibility of good/bad behavior may induce compliant/pro-
social behavior due to social sanctions and social rewards (Gerber, Green, and Larimer,
2008; Funk, 2010). Also, allowing for free communication between interacting agents
before they take actions has proven to change outcomes in specic experimental settings
2While pro-social behavior usually refers to actions that mainly benet others, compliance with
rules involves elements of pro-social behavior if the penalty is small. In our case, returning items on
time most likely involves both, compliance with rules and pro-social behavior.
5that broadly relate to pro-social behavior, such as hold-up problem games (Ellingsen
and Johannesson, 2004), trust games and hidden-information games (Charness and
Dufwenberg, 2006; 2010) and dictator games (Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2008; An-
dreoni and Rao, 2010). However, relatively little is known about the eect of specic
message contents on promoting pro-social behavior and compliance with rules. Rele-
vant exceptions to the latter are Schultz et al (2007), Ayres, Raseman and Shih (2009),
Karlan et al (2011), Dal B o and Dal B o (2009) and Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler
(2009).
Schultz et al (2007) and Ayres, Raseman and Shih (2009) show that home electricity
consumption can be reduced when households get periodic reports on the consumption
of comparable neighbors. An important dierence between these studies and ours is
that in our case there is a clear rule that dictates what to do, namely to return the
items on time, as opposed to the unwritten, informal norm of not over-consuming
electricity. Karlan et al (2011) show that when individuals are reminded of their
previous saving commitments, the likelihood of reaching their saving goal increases.
The main dierence with our setting is that in Karlan et al (2011), individuals self-
impose to a saving rule, with no punishment associated for breaking it. Dal B o and
Dal B o (2009) conducted a series of laboratory two-player public good experiments to
study the inuence on individual contribution levels when players receive a message
appealing to moral rules. They showed that receiving a message with a moral standard
increases contribution levels, although the eect is transitory. Again, our study involves
a setting with a clearly dened rule, as opposed to an unwritten social norm, and
furthermore, it involves a eld experiment that studies the eect of sending messages
in a natural environment. Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2009) study the eect of
dierent mailings to potential evaders of TV license fees. They nd that a legal threat
mailing signicantly increases compliance rates, while neither a moral appeal nor a
social information mailings have any eect. The main dierence to Fellner, Sausgruber,
and Traxler (2009) is that we can measure compliance and non-compliance perfectly
and study the eect of messages on these dierent types of behavior. Furthermore, our
data on user characteristics allow us to study dierential eects with regard to gender,
age and nationality. Finally, their setting and ours also dier in terms of the associated
penalties for non-compliance. While in their case these are very high, in ours they are
relatively minor.
6Our ndings are also relevant for a growing literature that investigates gender dif-
ferences in preferences and behavior (e.g. Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Charness
and Gneezy, 2007; Charness and Rustichini, 2009; Croson and Buchan, 1999; and
Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; see Croson and Gneezy, 2009, for a comprehensive and
exhaustive survey). Evidence on gender dierences in social preferences, altruistic be-
havior and cooperation seems to be mixed. Croson and Gneezy (2009) suggest that
this is likely to be due to women being more sensitive to the experimental context than
men. Our study complements this literature by studying gender dierences on rule
compliance in an everyday and natural situation (see Levitt and List, 2007). We nd
that there are no signicant dierences by sex in reactions to the email intervention.
Finally, our paper is also relevant for a strand of literature that investigates the
eects of culture on behavior. There is evidence that culture matters in a variety of
outcomes, such as labor force participation and fertility (Fernandez, 2007a; Fernan-
dez, 2007b), economic exchange (Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2009), redistribution
(Luttmer and Singhal, 2010; Fong and Luttmer, 2009), cooperation (Herrmann, Th oni
and G achter, 2008; G achter, Herrmann and Th oni, 2010), and, most related to our
study, violations of rules (Fisman and Miguel, 2007).3 Our study is consistent with
Fisman and Miguel (2007) in that there are major dierences in compliant behavior by
individuals with dierent countries of origin. To start with, we nd that Asian people
comply with rules more than other nationalities. Also, they react quite strongly to
receiving emails, together with people from English speaking countries. Finally there
are groups of countries (Western-Southern Europe, Russia, Latin America), where
compliance is poor to begin with, and there is little reaction to receiving emails from
libraries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the setting,
namely the Network of Public Libraries in the city of Barcelona, and explains in detail
the design of the eld experiment, as well as the identication strategy. Section 3 is
devoted to the presentation and discussion of the results. Finally, Section 4 presents
conclusions.
3Fisman and Miguel (2007) study parking violations by diplomats in New York City. Since diplo-
mats could not be ned due to diplomatic immunity, the setting allowed the analysis of which nation-
alities were more likely to break rules in an environment of zero punishment.
72 The Field Experiment
2.1 The Setting: Network of Public Libraries of Barcelona
The Network of Public Libraries in the city of Barcelona is managed by a central
body dependent on the City Hall of Barcelona and the Government of the Province
of Barcelona. It encompasses 32 libraries spread throughout the city of Barcelona.
Each library oers the possibility of borrowing items such as books, DVDs, CDs and
magazines; other services such as internet access, exhibitions and workshops are also
provided.
The rules governing the borrowing of dierent item types are clearly dened and
are the same for all the 32 libraries. At the time of our study, a book could be borrowed
for 21 days, while all other item types (DVDs, CDs and magazines) could be borrowed
for 7 days. Users could also explicitly ask to extend the due date if no other user
required that item. As for the maximum number of items to be taken, each user
could simultaneously take a total of 30 items, 15 books and magazines, and 15 CDs
and DVDs. The penalty associated with returning an item late involved being barred
from borrowing new items for a time period equivalent to the number of days elapsed
between the due date and the actual return day. In particular, there was no monetary
ne associated with not complying with the return policy.
2.2 Data
We observed the complete borrowing/returning behavior for every single user at the
Network of Public Libraries of Barcelona from January 2009 until the beginning of
November 2009. This included any user at any of the 32 public libraries in Barcelona.
For every transaction we observed (i) the user code, gender, age, and nationality,
(ii) the item code and its characteristics, that is, whether it was a book, DVD, CD,
or magazine, (iii) the dates of the transaction, that is, the date when the item was
borrowed and returned, and (iv) the library where the transaction took place. With
this information we were able to follow the exact borrowing behavior of every single
user of the Network of Public Libraries in Barcelona. Given that our design is based on
emails, we concentrate on the sample of those users with a known email.4 This gives
4The Network of Public Libraries knows the email addresses of about 40% of the registered users.
8us about 50,000 dierent users, who borrowed over a million items.
The data set encompasses a diverse set of users in terms of individual characteris-
tics (age, gender and nationality), but also in terms of their borrowing behavior. In
particular, we observe the type of items they borrow (books, or other item types),
whether they are compliant or not, as well as whether they are persistent late return-
ers. Furthermore, libraries also present signicant dierences in terms of their size,
both in terms of number of users and number of transactions, location and proportion
of late returners.
2.3 Email Contents
The Network of Public Libraries in the city of Barcelona maintains constant commu-
nication with its users via email. Most emails include information on the activities
organized in the dierent libraries of the city, such as exhibitions or workshops, and
on opening hours. In collaboration with the Network, we designed ve dierent email
messages (see Table 1) that were randomly assigned to the users. The objective of the
study is to evaluate the impact of these messages on users' behavior.
[Table 1 here]
As can be seen from Table 1, Control refers to the control treatment. It provides
a link to the webpage of the Network of Public Libraries in Barcelona. The rest of
the treatment messages build on Control, adding dierent pieces of information.
Reminder represents a general reminder to return items on time. Note that this
general reminder (and the other treatments as well) do not include any reference to
particular items that were borrowed at the time of receiving the email. Therefore, it can
be directed to all users, regardless of whether they had borrowed any item at the time of
receiving the message. Social builds on Reminder, incorporating a moral and social
dimension. It adds an appeal to the inuence of individual behavior on the proper
overall functioning of the public system of libraries. These two emails, Reminder and
Social, together with Control, were designed to target any possible user, regardless
of whether the user had returned some items later than the due date in the recent past.
The nal two emails were specically designed to target users with late returns in the
recent past. Email Late adds to the content of Reminder a statement that identies
9the user as having recently returned an item late. Finally, Penalty builds on Late
adding a reminder of the actual penalty associated with returning an item late.
In our analysis, we will compare the eect of receiving a Reminder, Social, Late
or Penalty email, with that of receiving Control. That is, we will study whether
any of the four treatments improves with respect to a Control message. Furthermore,
the contents of the emails potentially allow us to distinguish between dierent motives
for behavioral changes. For example, the dierence in the texts between Reminder
and Social allows us to evaluate whether appealing to the importance of one's con-
tribution to the good functioning of a public service is more eective than a generic
reminder. Comparing Late with Reminder is useful to test whether being identied
as non-compliant with the rule has a dierent eect than the generic reminder. Fi-
nally, Penalty allows us to test for any dierential eect of recalling the penalties
associated with violation of the rule.
It was our aim to design emails with general contents that could be applied to many
settings of interest beside libraries. For this reason, no email makes any reference to
particular items that may have been borrowed at the time of receiving the email. Also,
we kept in mind that not all settings permit the type of precise data on individual
behavior that we had at the moment of treatment (e.g., identifying users as late and
non-late). In this vein, three of our emails, Control, Reminder and Social, are
general in the sense of not using any information on the behavior of users prior to the
treatment, and can therefore easily be adapted to other settings (e.g. driving alerts,
voting, donating blood, or referee reports). On top of that, for cases where information
on individual behavior is available to the policy maker, it is important to analyze the
potential eects on behavior of using such specic information. In our case, Late and
Penalty use information on user history in order to directly target non-compliant
individuals.
2.4 Randomization
In this section we describe the design and procedures of the eld experiment. We
start by presenting the timing of the email intervention, as well as the randomization
of users into the control and dierent treatments. Then, we evaluate whether the
random assignment of users to the control and dierent treatments was successfully
10accomplished. Finally, we comment on attrition rates.
As for the setup of the experiment, we sent emails in two dierent waves. Wave
1 was sent on July 1st, 2009, when we reached about 36,700 users. Wave 2 was sent
on September 15th, 2009, when we reached about 38,300 users. Overall, we reached
about 50,000 dierent users.5
In Wave 1 we considered all the active users between January 1st and May 5th,
2009 and classied them into two categories: late users and non-late users. An active
user is a user who borrowed at least one item during the time interval mentioned. A
late user is a user who returned an item after the due date at least once during the
time interval. A non-late user is a user who did not return any item late during the
time interval. There were a total of 21,571 late users and 15,106 non-late users in
Wave 1. Late users were randomly assigned to the ve dierent treatments Control,
Reminder, Social, Late and Penalty, while non-late users were randomly assigned
to Control, Reminder and Social only. The randomization was carried out at the
user level and in order to ensure balance across dierent libraries, we stratied the
randomization using the library at which users signed up.
In Wave 2 we considered all the active users between March 1st and July 31st,
2009. Note that in this case we have users who were already active in Wave 1 and new
active users, namely those users who were active only between May and July. With
regard to the new active users, about 10,500 individuals, we repeated the randomization
procedure as in Wave 1. We rst classied the new active users into late and non-late
users, 5,191 and 5,301 users, respectively. Second, late users were randomly assigned to
the ve treatments, while the non-late users were randomly assigned to the Control,
Reminder and Social treatments only. Also, as in Wave 1, the randomization was
carried out at the user level and in order to ensure balance across dierent libraries, we
stratied the randomization using the library codes where users signed up. The active
users in Wave 2 who were also active in Wave 1, about 28,500 individuals, received
exactly the same email as in Wave 1. Exceptions were those users who were allocated to
Late or Penalty in Wave 1 but who, during the interval between March 1st 2009 and
5In each wave we sent about 50,000 emails but not all emails were actually delivered. About 30%
of email addresses turned out to be invalid and the email messages were returned to the server as
messages that were never delivered. We therefore restrict our analysis to those users, to whom the
message was delivered.
11July 31st 2009, were never late again. There were about 700 of such users, who were
excluded from the randomization, and hence received no email in Wave 2. Therefore,
there was a total of 20,556 late users and 17,725 non-late users in Wave 2.
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of all users, both non-late and late, who
were randomly assigned to treatments Control, Reminder and Social in Waves
1 (top) and 2 (bottom). Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of late users only,
randomly assigned to the ve treatments in Waves 1 (top) and 2 (bottom). Note that
late users in Control, Reminder and Social appear in both Tables 2 and 3. The
last column in Tables 2 and 3 report the p-values for the F-Test of equality of variable
means across all groups.
[Tables 2 and 3 here]
Consistent with the random assignment of users to treatments, the average user has
similar values in the observable characteristics across the dierent treatments. In fact,
as shown by the p-values in the last column in both Tables 2 and 3, the null hypothesis
of equality in the means can rarely be rejected. An exception is the proportion of
foreigners, possibly due to the valid email address correction (see footnote 5). However,
the mean values do not show sizable dierences.
As for the characteristics of the average user in the Network of the Public Libraries
in the city of Barcelona, 42% of users are male users and the proportion of foreigners
is around 30%. The average age is 33. The typical user also borrows quite frequently,
with the average total number of loans between January and November exceeding 30.
Finally, the majority of borrowed items are books (60%), followed by DVDs (28%) and
CDs (9%). Magazines comprise the least frequent type of loans.
From Tables 2 and 3, we can also see the magnitude of the problem of late returns
in the Network of Public Libraries in Barcelona. Overall, considering both late and
non-late users, 30% of loans per user are returned later than the due date. Moreover,
considering only those users who have been late at least once, around 60% of the loans
per user are returned after the due date. Furthermore, the typical user returns the
borrowed items on average more than a day and a half later than the due date when
we consider all late and non-late users. When we only consider late users, the typical
user returns the borrowed items on average 6.5 days later than the due date. This
12shows that returning items late is a common, extended and pervasive habit among the
public library users in Barcelona.
In our analysis, as is standard practice in any randomized eld experiment, we
concentrate on the post-treatment period, that is, on the behavior of users after the
email intervention. For those users who received the email message in Wave 1, the
post-treatment starts on the 1st of July. For those users who got the email for the rst
time in Wave 2, the post-treatment starts on the 15th of September. However, not all
users who received the email treatment appear in the post-treatment period, that is,
some users do not borrow any item at any time in the post-treatment period, so that
we cannot observe their compliant or non-compliant behavior. One important issue
that needs to be addressed is whether the randomization is still valid when we look at
those users whose behavior can actually be observed during the post-treatment period.
In particular, we would like to know whether attrition rates between pre and post-
treatment periods are signicantly dierent across the control and treatment groups.
To address this issue, we dene, separately for Waves 1 and 2, the attrition rates, that
is, the share of users who received the email treatment but who did not borrow any
item in the post-treatment period.
[Table 4]
On average, between 51 and 54% (see column (1) in Table 4), and 46 and 47%
(see column (4) in Table 4), of emailed users did not borrow any item in the post-
treatment period. However, that is unlikely due to the email intervention, but rather
reects natural uctuations in borrowing rates over time.6 More importantly, the null
of equal attrition rates among control and treatment groups is not rejected at standard
levels of signicance, regardless of whether we use individual or joint tests, as shown in
columns (2) and (5) of Table 4. When we add library xed eects (shown in columns
(3) and (6)), the coecients on the treatments are not signicant at the 5% level,
although they come out jointly signicant because library xed eects are individually
signicant.7 To summarize, this analysis prevents possible concerns about attrition
being a handicap for the interpretation of our results.
6Indeed, computing the comparable attrition rates for those users with unknown email, we get an
average of 50%. This shows that the attrition rates we observe after treatment are a rule rather than
an exception.
7We also redid Tables 2 and 3 for those users who were treated and did borrow items in the
132.5 Identication Strategy
We are interested in evaluating the eect of email messages on the behavior of users.
We will focus on two dierent dependent variables. First, we look at the proportion of
late returned items per user (Proportion Late). This is a direct measure of how users
comply with the rule. Second, we use the average number of days between the return
date and the due date per user (\Actual Due" Date). When this dierence is positive
the item was returned late and when this dierence is negative the item was returned
early compared to the due date. In contrast to the rst dependent variable, which
measures late/non-late per item in a binary way, this second variable also takes into
account the extent of late or early returns.
In a randomized experiment like ours, the causal eect of the treatments can be
estimated as follows:
Yi =  + 1Reminderi + 2Sociali + 3 Latei + 4Penaltyi + i (1)
where the dependent variable Yi is either (i) the proportion of late returns per user, or
(ii) the average number of days between the return date and the due date per user.8
Reminder, Social, Late, and Penalty are dummy variables taking a value of 1 when
user i was assigned to Reminder, or Social, or Late, or Penalty, respectively.
The omitted treatment to which these variables are compared is Control.
Consistent with our design, we will estimate equation (1) in two dierent ways.
First, we compare Reminder and Social to Control for all users, independent
of whether they were late or not in the pre-treatment period.9 Second, we compare
Reminder, Social, Late and Penalty to the Control restricted to all users who
were late at least once in the pre-treatment period.
post-treatment period (available upon request). We obtained the same results, qualitatively speaking,
showing that the control and treated groups are comparable in all the observable characteristics.
8Note that the dependent variables are obtained by collapsing all the transactions at the user level.
For example, for a user with 5 transactions that was late with 4 of them has a proportion of late
returns of 4=5. In the subsequent analysis, when we add control variables, we also collapse them at
the user level.
9Here, to be precise, we estimate Yi = +1Reminderi +2Sociali +i for all users who received
a Control, Reminder, or Social treatment.
143 Results
3.1 Average Treatment Eects
We estimate equation (1) by OLS. Table 5 reports the results for Control, Re-
minder, and Social, covering all users, both late and non-late users, who got one
of these emails in Waves 1 and 2. Table 6 reports the results for all ve treatments
restricted to the late users only.
[Tables 5 and 6 here]
The rst three columns in both Tables 5 and 6 refer to the proportion of late returns
per user, while the last three columns refer to the average number of days between the
return date and due date per user. In both cases the rst column reports the results of
estimating equation (1) without any controls. The second column controls for users'
demographics, such as gender, whether the user is foreign or not, and for dierent age
intervals. It also includes controls for dierent months between July and November,
as well as the number of borrowed items. Finally, in the second column we also add
controls for users' behavior prior to the treatment, which measures their propensity for
late returns and for the average number of days between the return date and the due
date per user, prior to the treatment. The third column adds more controls in addition
to all the previous variables, accounting for the item type (whether it refers to a book,
DVD, CD or a magazine), as well as library xed eects.10
We start by commenting on the results of Table 5. Both Reminder and Social are
signicant and negative, showing that both email treatments signicantly reduce the
proportion of late returns and the number of days between the return date and the due
date. Furthermore, the more controls we add, the smaller the standard errors become.
Taking the estimates of the third column, receiving a Reminder email decreases the
proportion of late returns by 1.4 percentage points with respect to Control, while
in the case of Social, the reduction is 1.8 percentage points. Evaluated at the mean
propensity of being late for the control group (approximately 36 percent), the reduction
in late returns lies between 4 percent (Reminder) and 5 percent (Social). Moreover,
receiving a treatment email also signicantly decreases the number of days between
10In all specications, we discard transactions that were due on a holiday, when the library was
closed.
15the return date and the due date: the Reminder and Social emails decrease this
dierence on average by almost half a day with respect to Control. Note also that
the coecients of the Reminder and the Social emails are not statistically dierent
from each other, meaning that moral suasion did not aect users' behavior dierently
from the general reminder.
From Table 6, when comparing all four treatments for users who were late at least
once in the pre-treatment period, we see that all four of them are signicant; both for
the proportion of late returns per user and for the average number of days between
the return date and the due date per user. For instance, from column (3) we see that
the treatment eects (compared to the control) range from -2.4 percentage points for
the Reminder to -4.3 percentage points for the Penalty. As for the number of
days between the return date and the due date, the reduction lies between 0.54 and
0.87 days. Clearly, the most eective treatment seems to be the Penalty treatment,
reducing the proportion of late returns per user by 4.3 percentage points and the
average number of days between the return date and the due date per user by almost
a day. Evaluated at the means of the control group, this corresponds to a reduction in
10 percent for the proportion of late returns, and a reduction of over 100 percent for
the number of days between the return and the due date. Moreover, for the proportion
of late returns, the coecient estimates of the Reminder and Penalty treatments
are signicantly dierent from each other, showing that the late identication and the
penalty reminder make a signicant contribution on top of a general reminder.
One may wonder whether the eect mainly comes from the proportion of items that
are pending at the time of receiving one of the email treatments or whether it is also the
case that rule compliance improves more generally. This is important to understand
when we think of the applicability to other settings. In order to address this question,
we rst create a variable, called Pending, which calculates the proportion of pending
items per user at the time of receiving an email. Then, we interact the treatment
dummies with the proportion of pending items at the user level. Table 7 reports the
results.
[Table 7 here]
As can be seen, the interaction terms are insignicant for the proportion of late
returns (columns (1) and (3)). Therefore, the eects found in Tables 5 and 6 came
16not only from the proportion of loans that were pending at the time of the email
intervention; instead, the treatments aected all users' behavior, whether items were
pending or not. On the other hand, for the average number of days between the return
date and the due date (columns (2) and (4)), the interaction terms are negative and
signicant, implying that users with a larger proportion of pending items return their
items earlier than users with a lower proportion of pending items.
To sum up, the results from this section show that a simple email is eective in
promoting better compliance with rules. Furthermore, the results are highly robust
with regard to other specications. If instead of collapsing the data at the user level,
we estimate random eects with transaction level data, the results we obtain are both
qualitatively and quantitatively similar (available upon request). Finally, note again
that the intervention mechanism is non-invasive, virtually costless and readily appli-
cable to other settings. In this light, the capability to reduce the proportion of late
returns by 10 percent, as it is the case for the Penalty email, appears to be an
attractive option.
3.2 Duration of the Treatment Eect
Having shown that receiving an email has a signicant eect on behavior, we now ad-
dress the question related to the duration of the eect. This is important to fully eval-
uate the impact of such an intervention. To this end, we partition the post-treatment
period into four dierent time windows: (i) July 1-July 31: the eect in the rst month
following the rst wave of emails, (ii) August 1-September 14: the time interval be-
tween a month after the rst wave of emails and the beginning of the second wave, (iii)
September 15-October 15: the eect one month after the second wave of emails, and
(iv) after October 15.
Table 8 reports the estimates for equation (1) separately for the four time windows.
The rst page of Table 8 refers to treatments Control, Reminder, and Social,
covering all users, while the second page of Table 8 reports the results for all ve
treatments (restricted to previously late users only).
[Table 8 here]
The tables show that the eect of getting an email is short term, but it is replicated
after getting a second email. No matter whether we use the proportion of late returns
17per user as a dependent variable, or the average number of days between the return
date and the due date, the eect lasts for one month. The rst emails that were sent on
July 1 had an eect in the period July 1-July 31, but the eect becomes insignicant in
the period August 1-September 15. The same pattern can be observed for the emails
that were sent on September 15. For most email messages (see the second page of Table
8), we can reject the null that treatments are the same in the rst and the second time
window. However, the treatment eects are the same for the rst and the third time
window.11 Therefore, users who stopped reacting to the rst email react again upon
reception of the second message, in a comparable manner.
3.3 Heterogenous Treatment Eects by User Characteristics
After estimating the average treatment eect of sending dierent emails, we now pro-
ceed to the analysis of heterogeneous reactions depending on relevant user-specic
characteristics. We start by testing for dierential treatment eects that depend on
users' previous behavior in terms of late returns/days between return and due date.
Afterwards, we study whether there are signicant dierences in behavior depending
on age, gender and nationality.
3.3.1 Previous Compliance with the Rule
It is conceivable that the reaction to the dierent treatments is related to the users'
compliance history, that is, their behavior prior to the treatment. To test for this,
we interact the treatment variables with Prior Late and Prior \Actual Due". Prior
Late and Prior \Actual Due" refer to the average user-specic proportion of late
returns/days between return and due date in the pre-treatment period.
[Table 9 here]
Table 9 reports the results. We observe that the interaction terms are mostly
negative and signicant, suggesting that the less rule-compliant users were in the pre-
treatment, the stronger is their reaction to the treatments. When we compare the
treatments to Control according to the proportion of late returns (columns (1) and
11There is one exception, with Penalty and the proportion of late as the dependent variable. Here,
the eect is stronger for the rst email than for the second email.
18(3)), we see that the Reminder treatment has a stronger eect on those users who
had a higher proportion of late returns prior to the treatment. When the treatment
variables are interacted with the user-specic Prior \Actual Due" (columns (2) and
(4)), we see that the previous non-compliers have a stronger reaction to the Reminder
message, but also to the Late and Penalty messages.
To summarize, the email treatments are especially eective in changing the behavior
of a very relevant sample of users, namely those breaking the rule more often. Also, it
is important to see that there are no crowding out eects. For users who have a value
of Prior Late and Prior \Actual Due" equal to 0, the estimated treatment eects
are still negative (some of them signicant), suggesting a positive eect on the \good
types" as well.
3.3.2 Age
We now test for dierential treatment eects that are related to dierent age groups.
To this end, we reproduce the estimations of equation (1) separately for the following
age groups: below 20 years of age, between 20 and 40, between 40 and 60, and above
60. Table 10 reports the results.
[Table 10 here]
When we compare Reminder and Social for all users (rst page of Table 10), we
see the strongest reaction to the emails coming from users in the age categories 20 to
40 and 40 to 60. For users between 20 and 40, both emails are signicant, reducing
the proportion of late returns per user by around 2 percentage points and the average
number of days between the return date and the due date per user by more than half a
day. For users between 40 and 60, the eect of a treatment email is a reduction of the
proportion of late returns by up to 2.6 percentage points, and a reduction in the average
number of days between the return date and the due date of up to 0.9 days. For the
youngest and oldest age groups, no signicant eects are observed. Overall, dierences
across age groups are modest and we cannot reject the null of equal treatment eects.
When we look at late users only (second page of Table 10), the strongest reaction
to the email treatments again comes from users in the age classes 20 to 40 and 40 to 60,
at least for the proportion of late returns. However, dierences are not large enough
to reject the null of equality across groups. An interesting feature shown in the table
19is that the Penalty treatment is signicant in all age groups for at least one of the
two measures we look at. This shows that the Penalty treatment is eective in all
age groups. Finally, when we look at the highest age group, i.e. users above 60, we see
that when the eects are signicant they become very large, reducing the proportion of
late returns per user by even 10 percentage points for Late and 8.7 percentage points
for Penalty treatments.
In sum, even though we observe some dierences of treatment eects across age
groups, these are generally not large enough to reject the null of equality. As for the
dierent messages, it turns out that the Penalty treatment is particularly eective
and seems to work independent of the users' age group.
3.3.3 Gender
Whether and why gender matters has increasingly attracted economists' attention.
In a recent comprehensive survey, Croson and Gneezy (2009) nd that women and
men dier along some dimensions (e.g. competitiveness), but not necessarily in others
(social preferences revealed in lab experiments). Our data oer a rare opportunity
to measure gender dierences in rule compliance in daily life, and also the reaction
to dierent email treatments. For the subsequent analysis, we construct interaction
variables between our gender variable, Male, and the treatment dummy variables.
[Table 11 here]
Table 11 reports the results. As for the Male dummy, it is statistically not sig-
nicant, meaning that in the control group, women and men show similar patterns
in compliant behavior.12 As for the estimated interaction terms, the coecients are
(with one exception) insignicant, indicating that there are no gender dierences in the
reaction to the emails. In other words, both women and men are highly comparable
when it comes to rule compliance and the reaction to messages aimed at promoting
rule compliance.
3.3.4 Nationality
There is sound evidence that nationality is an important determinant of behavior in a
variety of settings. Fisman and Miguel (2007), for example, show interesting nationality
12We nd the same result if we do not include previous compliance as a control.
20dierences in the determinants of corruption. Our database allows us to distinguish
between the users' countries of origin, and hence we can evaluate whether the behavior
of users diers by nationality, and whether there are dierential reactions to receiving
an email based on users' nationality.
We classify users into 8 geographical areas according to their nationality: (i) Spain,
(ii) Northern and Central Europe (Germany, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Netherlands,
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Austria), (iii) Southern and Western Europe (France,
Italy, Greece, Portugal), (iv) English speaking countries (UK, US, Canada, Ireland,
and Australia), (v) Eastern Europe and Russia (Bulgaria, Croatia, Slovakia, Estonia,
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Russia, Czech Republic, Ukraine, Georgia,
Armenia), (vi) Latin America (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, El
Salvador, Uruguay, Venezuela, Chile, Costa Rica, Panama), and (vii) Asia (Philippines,
Japan, Nepal, China, India, South Korea). Spain accounts for the vast majority of users
(around 70%), followed by Latin America with 19%, Southern and Western Europe
with 6%, and at the bottom of the distribution is Asia with 1%.
We rst analyze whether foreign users dier in their proportion of late returns
with respect to Spaniards. Table A.1 in the appendix reports the average user specic
propensity for being late in the pre and post-treatment period by nationality groups
(columns (1) and (2), respectively), where the omitted variable is Spaniards. It is clear
that there are signicant dierences. The proportion of late returns in nationality
groups (iii) to (vi) is higher than that presented by Spaniards. Users from Latin
America and from the English speaking countries are among those geographical areas
that show the highest dierential with respect to Spaniards. On the other hand, Asian
users seem to show a lower propensity for being late than Spaniards.
An interesting question is whether there are dierential treatment eects that are
related to dierent nationalities. Table 12 reports the results on the proportion of late
returns per user and on the average number of days between the return date and the
due date per user for the seven nationality groups separately.
[Table 12]
There are remarkable dierences. First, users from English speaking countries react
signicantly to every single treatment. They reduce the proportion of late returns by
21up to 30 percentage points and reduce the average number of days between the return
date and the due date by up to 8.5 days. Previously late users from Asia also react
signicantly, in particular to the treatments Reminder, Late and Penalty. With
the exception of Spain, we do not nd consistent and signicant eects for the other
nationality groups.
We now directly compare the eects found for Spaniards with the eects found
for English speaking and Asian countries, controlling for dierent initial propensities
of being late, as well as dierent reactions depending on prior propensity to be late.
Given that dierent nationality groups show very dierent proportion of late returns
per user, as well as a dierent average number of days between the return date and the
due date per user, one concern might be that some nationalities react more strongly
not because of the nationality but because they had a very dierent compliant behavior
to begin with. To deal with such concern and to test for the robustness of the results,
we have replicated the analysis in Tables A.2 and A.3, including interactions between
prior behavior and the treatment. As can be seen from Table A.2, users coming from
English speaking countries react signicantly more than Spaniards, for both measures
of the dependent variable. For Asian users, as shown in Table A.3, we also see that
the eect is signicantly higher than for Spaniards, but only for the late users and
treatments Reminder and Penalty. As such, users from English speaking countries
and Asian users react strongly, despite having very dierent initial levels of compliance.
Finally, we did a similar exercise for the other nationality groups, but we did not nd
signicant results (all results are available upon request).
4 Conclusions
In this paper we study the eect of a very simple, versatile, and virtually costless
mechanism, such as sending email messages, on promoting compliance with rules. The
study was conducted in the Public Libraries of Barcelona, where compliance with rules
means returning items on time. What makes our setting unique is that we observe a
large number of users in a daily-life situation, where rules are simple and well-dened,
and where compliance is perfectly measurable. The users are diverse in terms of gender,
age and nationality, which allows us to study dierent reactions depending on relevant
user characteristics.
22Using the methodology of a randomized eld experiment, we show that sending
email messages helps to promote compliance with rules. The largest eect comes from
an email reminding users of the penalties associated with late returns, which decreases
the proportion of late returns by 10 percent, and the average number of days between
the return date and the due date by over 100 percent. Yet, the eects are substantially
bigger for certain subgroups. For instance, users with a high proportion of late returns
in the pre-treatment period react more strongly than the other users do. Also, age
and nationality appear to aect reactions to the messages. In contrast, and maybe
somewhat surprisingly, we nd no evidence for gender dierences in rule compliance
and in the reaction to receiving one of the email messages.
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26Table 1—Email Messages 
E-mail  Text 
Control  Dear User, 
 















Libraries of Barcelona 
 







For a good functioning of the Public Libraries it is important to return the items that are borrowed on time. 




Libraries of Barcelona 
 







In the last months you have returned an item late. If at some point you borrow an item from the library, please 




Libraries of Barcelona 
 









In the last months you have returned an item late. If at some point you borrow an item from the library, please 
remember that you have to return it on time. 
 
Remember that the time that a user will be excluded from the possibility of borrowing an item will be the 
same number of natural days elapsed since the day that the item should have been returned. The maximum 




Libraries of Barcelona 
 
In the next webpage you will find information on the services and activities offered by the  Libraries of Barcelona: 
 
http://www.bcn.es/biblioteques/ 
Notes: The text in bold refers to the new addition of the treatment email. The words in bold in the first column 
represent the labels we will use in the paper.  P-Value
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Equ. Means
Male 9438 0.42 0.49 9059 0.42 0.49 9423 0.42 0.49 0.67
Age 9448 32.71 13.83 9062 32.76 13.89 9434 33.07 13.78 0.16
Foreign 9467 0.28 0.45 9080 0.30 0.46 9452 0.30 0.46 0.07
Proportion Late 9467 0.33 0.39 9080 0.33 0.39 9452 0.33 0.39 0.94
"Actual - Due" Date 9376 1.74 16.75 8995 1.53 16.37 9349 1.31 15.86 0.19
Nr. Loans Total 9467 31.51 53.46 9080 31.65 52.58 9452 32.73 58.33 0.25
Nr. Loans 2009 - Half 1 9467 11.92 18.80 9080 11.89 19.01 9452 12.48 22.21 0.08
Book 9467 0.60 0.42 9080 0.60 0.42 9452 0.61 0.42 0.30
CD 9467 0.09 0.23 9080 0.10 0.23 9452 0.09 0.23 0.49
DVD 9467 0.28 0.37 9080 0.28 0.37 9452 0.27 0.36 0.32
Magazine 9467 0.03 0.13 9080 0.02 0.12 9452 0.02 0.11 0.12
Male 10037 0.42 0.49 9758 0.41 0.49 10151 0.41 0.49 0.81
Age 10049 32.74 14.09 9763 32.49 13.98 10157 32.79 13.73 0.28
Foreign 10064 0.28 0.45 9782 0.29 0.45 10180 0.30 0.46 0.01
Proportion Late 10063 0.35 0.39 9782 0.36 0.39 10180 0.35 0.39 0.92
"Actual - Due" Date 9923 1.58 14.69 9639 1.54 14.82 10047 1.48 14.33 0.89
Nr. Loans Total 10064 30.28 52.25 9782 30.12 51.25 10180 31.40 56.98 0.18
Nr. Loans 2009 - Half 1 10064 11.18 18.56 9782 11.01 18.67 10180 11.67 21.83 0.05
Book 10064 0.62 0.41 9782 0.62 0.41 10180 0.61 0.41 0.49
CD 10064 0.09 0.22 9782 0.09 0.22 10180 0.09 0.22 0.47
DVD 10064 0.27 0.36 9782 0.27 0.36 10180 0.27 0.36 0.31
Magazine 10064 0.03 0.13 9782 0.03 0.13 10180 0.03 0.12 0.23
Wave 1 (Active between 1.January-5.May)
Wave 2 (Active between 1.March-31.July)
Notes: All variables refer to all users, late and non-late, who were active in windows 1 (1 January-15 May) and 2 (1 March-31 July). All variables are obtained at the user
level. Male takes a value of 1 in case of male, Age shows the user's age in years, and Foreign is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in the case of Non-Spanish.
Proportion Late measures the proportion of late returns per user, and "Actual - Due" Date measures the average number of days between the return date and the deadline
per user. Number of Loans represents the number of loans per user. Book, CD, DVD and Magazine reflects the user's average share of Books, CD's, DVD's and Magazines.
The P-Value in the last column is for the F-Test of equality of variable means across all three groups.
TABLE 2 
User Randomization into Treatments CONTROL-REMINDER-SOCIAL
CONTROL REMINDER SOCIALP-Value
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Equ. Means
Male 4315 0.43 0.49 4182 0.43 0.50 4351 0.43 0.50 4333 0.43 0.50 4304 0.42 0.49 0.97
Age 4321 32.20 12.78 4187 32.30 12.83 4355 32.48 12.55 4343 32.41 12.76 4312 32.23 12.58 0.82
Foreign 4331 0.33 0.47 4195 0.35 0.48 4367 0.35 0.48 4355 0.34 0.48 4323 0.35 0.48 0.08
Proportion Late 4331 0.59 0.33 4195 0.58 0.33 4367 0.59 0.33 4355 0.58 0.33 4323 0.59 0.33 0.22
"Actual - Due" Date 4270 6.61 20.79 4143 5.94 20.42 4301 5.68 19.37 4288 5.91 19.08 4269 5.75 18.22 0.20
Nr. Loans Total 4331 46.15 67.88 4195 47.52 67.61 4367 48.54 76.08 4355 47.34 74.48 4323 48.00 74.16 0.62
Nr. Loans 2009 - Half 1 4331 17.48 24.19 4195 17.91 24.63 4367 18.50 29.57 4355 17.88 25.38 4323 18.35 27.10 0.39
Book 4331 0.50 0.39 4195 0.49 0.39 4367 0.50 0.39 4355 0.49 0.39 4323 0.48 0.39 0.20
CD 4331 0.12 0.24 4195 0.12 0.24 4367 0.12 0.24 4355 0.13 0.24 4323 0.12 0.24 0.77
DVD 4331 0.35 0.36 4195 0.36 0.37 4367 0.35 0.36 4355 0.36 0.36 4323 0.36 0.36 0.48
Magazine 4331 0.03 0.12 4195 0.03 0.13 4367 0.03 0.12 4355 0.03 0.12 4323 0.03 0.12 0.69
Male 4069 0.43 0.49 4014 0.43 0.49 4178 0.42 0.49 4158 0.42 0.49 4060 0.42 0.49 0.94
Age 4078 32.18 12.85 4019 31.82 12.74 4180 32.12 12.43 4166 32.31 12.81 4066 31.78 12.46 0.25
Foreign 4086 0.33 0.47 4029 0.34 0.47 4186 0.36 0.48 4178 0.35 0.48 4077 0.37 0.48 0.01
Proportion Late 4086 0.62 0.32 4029 0.62 0.32 4186 0.61 0.33 4178 0.61 0.32 4077 0.61 0.33 0.17
"Actual - Due" Date 3989 6.55 17.96 3940 6.50 18.20 4108 6.02 16.93 4067 6.27 17.70 3996 6.23 16.97 0.65
Nr. Loans Total 4086 46.52 68.75 4029 46.92 68.29 4186 48.43 76.93 4178 46.78 74.60 4077 47.71 74.96 0.75
Nr. Loans 2009 - Half 1 4086 17.51 24.55 4029 17.67 25.10 4186 18.54 30.35 4178 17.77 26.05 4077 18.38 27.46 0.32
Books 4086 0.50 0.39 4029 0.49 0.39 4186 0.49 0.39 4178 0.49 0.39 4077 0.48 0.39 0.63
CDs 4086 0.12 0.24 4029 0.11 0.23 4186 0.12 0.24 4178 0.12 0.24 4077 0.12 0.24 0.36
DVDs 4086 0.35 0.36 4029 0.36 0.37 4186 0.36 0.36 4178 0.36 0.36 4077 0.36 0.36 0.74
Magazines 4086 0.03 0.13 4029 0.04 0.14 4186 0.03 0.12 4178 0.03 0.12 4077 0.03 0.13 0.06
Wave 1 (Active between 1.January-5.May)
Wave 2 (Active between 1.March-31.July)
Notes: All variables refer to the late users who were active in windows 1 (1 January-15 May) and 2 (1 March-31 July). All variables are obtained at the user level. Male takes a value of 1 in case of male, age shows the user's age in years, and
Foreign is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in the case of Non-Spanish. Proportion Late measures the proportion of late returns per user, and "Actual - Due" Date measures the average number of days between the return date and the deadline
per user. Number of Loans represents the number of loans per user. Book, CD, DVD and Magazine reflects the user's average share of Books, CD's, DVD's and Magazines. The P-Value in the last column is for the F-Test of equality of variable
means across all five groups.
User Randomization into Treatments CRONTOL-REMINDER-SOCIAL-LATE-PENALTY
TABLE 3
CONTROL REMINDER SOCIAL LATE PENALTY(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reminder -0.0115 -0.0133* -0.0101 -0.0117
(0.00732) (0.00731) (0.0108) (0.0108)
Social -0.00189 -0.00272 0.00794 0.00716





Constant 0.539*** 0.544*** 0.687*** 0.475*** 0.481*** 0.646***
(0.00297) (0.00512) (0.0185) (0.00340) (0.00759) (0.0214)
Library FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 27999 27999 27999 21571 21571 21571
R-squared 0.0000 0.0000 0.006 0.0000 0.0000 0.007
Ho: all coefficients=0 (p-values) 0.2446 0.0000 0.1776 0.0000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Control-Rem.-Social-Late-Penalty
Wave 1 (Active between 1.January-5.May)
Wave 2 (Active between 1.March-31.July)




() () () () () ()
Reminder -0.00349 -0.00536 0.00275 0.00188
(0.00709) (0.00708) (0.0111) (0.0110)
Social 0.00879 0.00820 0.0208* 0.0213*





Constant 0.515*** 0.514*** 0.744*** 0.461*** 0.458*** 0.669***
(0.00288) (0.00498) (0.0246) (0.00347) (0.00780) (0.0288)
Library FE No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 30032 30032 30032 20556 20556 20556
R-squared 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.008
Ho: all coefficients=0 (p-values) 0.2001 0.0000 0.1736 0.0000
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy that takes value 1 if the user did not borrow any item in the post-treatment period and 0
otherwise. The top panel refers to Wave 1 and the bottom pannel refers to Wave 2. Columns (1), (2) and (3) refer to all users, while
columns (4), (5) and (6) refer to late users only. Standard errors in paranthesis. *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level;
***: significant at the 1% level.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reminder -0.0129* -0.0123* -0.0138* -0.387* -0.395** -0.468**
(0.00777) (0.00719) (0.00715) (0.203) (0.192) (0.189)
Social -0.0167** -0.0160** -0.0184*** -0.314 -0.296 -0.409**







August 0.0461*** 0.0681*** -0.397 0.525
(0.0131) (0.0134) (0.344) (0.348)
September 0.00603 0.00730 -2.582*** -2.514***
(0.0106) (0.0106) (0.278) (0.276)
October 0.0303*** 0.0253*** -3.247*** -3.414***
(0.00924) (0.00920) (0.248) (0.245)
November -0.391*** -0.375*** -12.74*** -11.91***
(0.0205) (0.0204) (0.545) (0.540)
Age 20-40 0.00709 -0.00423 0.372 0.00343
(0.00894) (0.00897) (0.240) (0.238)
Age 40-60 -0.0549*** -0.0610*** -0.976*** -1.172***
(0.00996) (0.00996) (0.266) (0.263)
Age over 60 -0.105*** -0.104*** -1.748*** -1.620***
(0.0159) (0.0159) (0.420) (0.416)
Male 0.00540 -0.00146 0.0573 -0.225
(0.00596) (0.00597) (0.159) (0.157)
Foreign 0.0454*** 0.0328*** 1.141*** 0.683***
(0.00676) (0.00684) (0.180) (0.181)
Number of Loans -0.00256*** -0.00321*** -0.0443*** -0.0698***
(0.000199) (0.000209) (0.00524) (0.00546)
Prior Late 0.331*** 0.317***
(0.00883) (0.00884)
Prior "Actual - Due" 0.227*** 0.201***
(0.00956) (0.00950)
Constant 0.358*** 0.276*** 0.379*** -0.583*** 1.963*** 4.803
(0.00546) (0.0114) (0.146) (0.143) (0.294) (4.105)
Library FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
R-squared 0.000 0.152 0.166 0.000 0.107 0.138
Number of users 14605 14442 14442 14157 13990 13990
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.6245 0.6078 0.5208 0.7204 0.6074 0.7566
H0: Reminder=Social=0 (p-value) 0.0769 0.0636 0.027 0.128 0.0995 0.0257
TABLE 5
CONTROL-REMINDER-SOCIAL
Notes: Proportion Late measures the proportion of late returns per user, columns (1)-(2)-(3), and "Actual - Due" Date measures the average
number of days between the return date and the due date per user, columns (4)-(5)-(6). See different email messages in Table 1. CD, DVD and
Magazine are dummy variables for the item type (omitted category: Book), August, September, October, November months dummies (omitted
category: July), and Age 20-40, Age 40-60 and Age over 60 are age dummies (omitted category: Age under 20). Male takes a value of 1 in case
of male, Foreign a value of 1 in case of non-Spanish, and Number of Loans is the average number of loans per user. Prior Late and Prior "Actual 
- Due" refer to proportion of late returns per user and the average number of days between the return date and the due date, both prior to the
treatment. Robust standard errors in paranthesis. *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. 
Proportion Late "Actual - Due" Date(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reminder -0.0266** -0.0235** -0.0239** -0.535* -0.565** -0.614**
(0.0109) (0.0102) (0.0101) (0.297) (0.281) (0.276)
Social -0.0275** -0.0270*** -0.0297*** -0.402 -0.425 -0.549**
(0.0109) (0.0101) (0.0100) (0.295) (0.279) (0.275)
Late -0.0252** -0.0274*** -0.0271*** -0.423 -0.496* -0.549**
(0.0108) (0.0100) (0.00994) (0.293) (0.278) (0.273)
Penalty -0.0391*** -0.0409*** -0.0433*** -0.674** -0.781*** -0.879***







August 0.0261* 0.0508*** -0.528 0.542
(0.0145) (0.0148) (0.393) (0.399)
September 0.0251** 0.0212* -2.576*** -2.629***
(0.0120) (0.0120) (0.326) (0.323)
October 0.0392*** 0.0316*** -3.874*** -4.124***
(0.0104) (0.0104) (0.291) (0.287)
November -0.518*** -0.502*** -15.40*** -14.69***
(0.0244) (0.0242) (0.683) (0.675)
Age 20-40 0.0138 -0.00112 0.944*** 0.515*
(0.0103) (0.0103) (0.288) (0.286)
Age 40-60 -0.0461*** -0.0549*** -0.512 -0.786**
(0.0117) (0.0117) (0.325) (0.321)
Age over 60 -0.0832*** -0.0843*** -0.754 -0.727
(0.0198) (0.0197) (0.543) (0.536)
Male 0.00577 -0.00151 0.106 -0.139
(0.00647) (0.00646) (0.179) (0.177)
Foreign 0.0496*** 0.0377*** 1.078*** 0.719***
(0.00700) (0.00706) (0.194) (0.194)
Number of Loans -0.00240*** -0.00298*** -0.0539*** -0.0727***
(0.000191) (0.000200) (0.00511) (0.00533)
Prior Late 0.301*** 0.293***
(0.0109) (0.0108)
Prior "Actual - Due" 0.170*** 0.156***
(0.00969) (0.00957)
Constant 0.440*** 0.301*** 0.158 0.759*** 2.689*** 4.478
(0.00769) (0.0145) (0.150) (0.209) (0.369) (3.690)
Library FE NO NO YES NO NO YES
R-squared 0.001 0.141 0.161 0.000 0.101 0.135
Number of users 12286 12205 12205 11846 11750 11750
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.9309 0.7307 0.5648 0.6554 0.6167 0.8135
H0: Reminder=Late (p-value) 0.8995 0.7013 0.7455 0.7043 0.8034 0.8125
H0: General=Penalty (p-value) 0.2491 0.0851 0.0532 0.6353 0.4404 0.3365
H0: Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.1948 0.1744 0.1027 0.388 0.3019 0.2253
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.5471 0.3204 0.2225 0.779 0.605 0.5753
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty=0 (p-value) 0.0072 0.0016 0.0006 0.2129 0.0772 0.0283
Notes: Proportion Late measures the proportion of late returns per user, columns (1)-(2)-(3), and "Actual - Due" Date measures the average number of
days between the return date and the due date per user, columns (4)-(5)-(6). See different email messages in Table 1. CD, DVD and Magazine are
dummy variables for the item type (omitted category: Book), August, September, October, November months dummies (omitted category: July), and Age
20-40, Age 40-60 and Age over 60 are age dummies (omitted category: Age under 20). Male takes a value of 1 in case of male, Foreign a value of 1 in
case of non-Spanish, and Number of Loans is the average number of loans per user. Prior Late and Prior "Actual - Due" refer to proportion of late
returns per user and the average number of days between the return date and the due date, both prior to the treatment. Robust standard errors in
paranthesis. *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. 
Proportion Late "Actual - Due" Date
TABLE 6
CONTROL-REMINDER-SOCIAL-LATE-PENALTYProp. Late "Actual - Due" Date Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reminder -0.00890 0.00583 -0.0182 -0.0522
(0.00924) (0.238) (0.0131) (0.353)
Social -0.0111 0.229 -0.0307** 0.139





Pending 0.249*** 8.985*** 0.267*** 10.16***
(0.0142) (0.369) (0.0202) (0.548)
Reminder*Pending -0.00897 -1.288*** -0.0151 -1.718**
(0.0190) (0.494) (0.0278) (0.752)
Social*Pending -0.0161 -1.826*** 0.000548 -2.334***





Constant 0.200 -1.347 -0.0436 -3.085
(0.143) (3.952) (0.147) (3.558)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Library FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.204 0.203 0.201 0.200
Number of users 14442 13990 12205 11750
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.8101 0.3443 0.3403 0.5863
H0: Reminder=Late (p-value) 0.7086 0.637
H0: Reminder=Penalty (p-value) 0.2468 0.3982
H0: Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.421 0.1812
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.6355 0.4762
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty=0 (p-value) 0.0835 0.6426
H0: Reminder=Social=0 (p-value) 0.4404 0.5407
H0: Reminder*Pend=Social*Pend (p-value) 0.7114 0.2792 0.5744 0.4127
H0: Reminder*Pend=Late*Pend (p-value) 0.7206 0.8162
H0: Reminder*Pend=Penalty*Pend (p-value) 0.4699 0.8655
H0: Late*Pend=Penalty*Pend (p-value) 0.2712 0.9491
H0: Reminder*Pend=Social*Pend=Late*Pend=Penalty*Pend (p-value) 0.5774 0.8568
H0: Reminder*Pend=Social*Pend=Late*Pend=Penalty*Pend=0 (p-value) 0.6655 0.0202
H0: Reminder*Pend=Social*Pend=0 (p-value) 0.6977 0.0007
Notes: This table reports differential treatment effects with respect to the proportion of pending items per user. Pending measures the proportion of pending items per user on the moment the email treatment is
received, while the interaction terms measure the differential treatment effects of the proportion of pending items. The full set of controls is used, as well as the library fixed effects. See the notes from previous tables.
Robust standard errors in paranthesis. *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. 
TABLE 7
Differential Treatment Effect with respect to the Proportion of  Pending Items
Control-Reminder-Social Control-Rem.-Social-Late-PenaltyJuly 1 - July 31 August 1 - Sept. 14 Sept. 15-Oct. 15 Oct. 15 onwards July 1 - July 31 August 1 - Sept. 14 Sept. 15-Oct. 15 Oct. 15 onwards
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Reminder -0.0290*** -0.00818 -0.0108 -0.0149 -0.805** -0.0564 -0.359** -0.206
(0.0112) (0.0129) (0.0110) (0.0120) (0.345) (0.341) (0.182) (0.183)
Social -0.0236** -0.00554 -0.0235** -0.00739 -0.883** 0.211 -0.545*** -0.251
(0.0111) (0.0128) (0.0108) (0.0119) (0.350) (0.325) (0.179) (0.192)
Constant 0.264 0.776*** 0.837*** -0.290*** 17.78** 8.006*** -7.453 -10.35***
(0.165) (0.0665) (0.175) (0.0297) (8.829) (2.308) (8.922) (0.777)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Library FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.132 0.129 0.146 0.109 0.128 0.151 0.184 0.153
Number of users 7029 5569 7379 6340 6934 5485 7200 5797
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.6268 0.8363 0.2465 0.5289 0.8181 0.4101 0.3062 0.8207
H0: Reminder=Social=0 (p-value) 0.0225 0.8108 0.0923 0.4626 0.0204 0.6785 0.0087 0.3591
Cross-Equation Joint Tests (p-values) Proportion Late "Actual-Due" Date
H0: Reminder: (1)=(2)=(3)=(4) 0.0487 0.0164
H0: Reminder(1)=Reminder(2) 0.2212 0.0564
H0 R i d (3) R i d (4) 0 8039 0 6914
Proportion Late "Actual - Due" Date
TABLE 8
Treatment Effects over Time (Treatments Control-Reminder-Social)
H0: Reminder(3)=Reminder(4) 0.8039 0.6914
H0: Reminder(1)=Reminder(3)  0.2500  0.2203
H0: Social: (1)=(2)=(3)=(4) 0.0470 0.0015
H0: Social(1)=Social(2) 0.2845   0.0049
H0: Social(3)=Social(4)  0.3159 0.4382
H0: Social(1)=Social(3)  0.9963 0.3494July 1 - July 31 August 1 - Sept. 14 Sept. 15-Oct. 15 Oct. 15 onwards July 1 - July 31 August 1 - Sept. 14 Sept. 15-Oct. 15 Oct. 15 onwards
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Reminder -0.0617*** -0.0117 -0.0296* -0.0135 -1.325*** -0.0755 -0.575** -0.411
(0.0154) (0.0171) (0.0154) (0.0170) (0.481) (0.483) (0.259) (0.258)
Social -0.0454*** 0.000166 -0.0224 -0.0235 -1.318*** 0.170 -0.613** -0.407
(0.0155) (0.0171) (0.0152) (0.0167) (0.503) (0.451) (0.252) (0.283)
Late -0.0389** -0.0208 -0.0378** -0.0128 -0.613 -0.513 -0.813*** -0.355
(0.0154) (0.0172) (0.0155) (0.0172) (0.496) (0.461) (0.251) (0.263)
Penalty -0.0754*** -0.0115 -0.0288* -0.0336* -1.415*** -0.383 -0.797*** 0.0792
(0.0153) (0.0170) (0.0157) (0.0173) (0.487) (0.436) (0.253) (0.247)
Constant 0.372** 0.428* 0.0785 -0.300*** 21.77** 6.729 -8.830*** -10.82***
(0.147) (0.235) (0.208) (0.0328) (10.33) (6.044) (2.417) (0.370)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Library FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.123 0.126 0.129 0.109 0.133 0.157 0.167 0.154
Number of users 6466 5294 6385 5457 6372 5205 6202 4907
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value)  0.2832 0.4876 0.6393 0.5527 0.9884 0.5920 0.8814 0.9879
H0: Reminder=Late (p-value)  0.1311 0.5939 0.5976 0.9684  0.1248 0.3407 0.3482 0.8395
H0: Reminder=Penalty (p-value) 0.3637 0.9939 0.9613 0.2469 0.8444 0.4886 0.3870 0.0560*
H0: Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.0153 0.5852 0.5700 0.2368 0.0897* 0.7553 0.9469 0.143
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty (p-value)  0.0673 0.6770 0.7980 0.5953 0.2980 0.3739 0.6985 0.1618
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty=0 (p-value) 0.0000 0.7052 0.1398 0.3676  0.0141** 0.4881 0.0088*** 0.1567
Cross-Equation Joint Tests (p-values) Proportion Late "Actual - Due" Date
H0: Reminder: (1)=(2)=(3)=(4) 0.0947 0.1151
H0: Reminder(1)=Reminder(2) 0.0301 0.0209
H0: Reminder(3)=Reminder(4) 0.4805  0.7655
H0: Reminder(1)=Reminder(3)  0.1403 0.1431
H0: Social: (1)=(2)=(3)=(4) 0.2702 0.0493
H0: Social(1)=Social(2) 0.0482 0.0059
H0: Social(3)=Social(4) 0.9615  0.7045
H0: Social(1)=Social(3) 0.2911 0.1678
H0: Late(1)=Late(2)=Late(3)=Late(4)  0.5951 0.8655
H0: Late(1)=Late(2) 0.4321 0.8527
H0: Late(3)=Late(4) 0.2743 0.4075
H0: Late(1)=Late(3)  0.9626 0.6979
H0: Penalty:  (1)=(2)=(3)=(4)  0.0330 0.0428
H0: Penalty(1)=Penalty(2)  0.0054  0.0552
H0: Penalty(3)=Penalty(4) 0.8340 0.1153
H0: Penalty(1)=Penalty(3)  0.0337 0.2305
TABLE 8 (continued)
Treatment Effects over Time (Control-Reminder-Social-Late-Penalty)
Notes: The table reports treatment effects for different time periods: The first month after the first email was sent (July1-July31), the second 6 weeks after the first email was sent (August 1-September 14), the first month after the second email was sent (September 15-October 15), the effect of the
second email after one month (October 15 onwards). The first page of the table encompasses the users in treatments Control-Reminder-Social, as in Table 5, and the second page of the table correspondsto the users in treatments Control-Reminder-Social-Late-Penalty, as in Table 6. The full set
of controls is used, as well as the library fixed effects. See the notes from previous tables. Robust standard errors in paranthesis. *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. 
Proportion Late "Actual - Due" DateProp. Late "Actual - Due" Date Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reminder -0.00243 -0.516*** 0.00488 -0.381
(0.00981) (0.189) (0.0193) (0.282)
Social -0.0137 -0.401** -0.0260 -0.450





Prior Late 0.334*** 0.307***
(0.0149) (0.0234)
Reminder*Prior Late  -0.0358* -0.0581*
(0.0212) (0.0331)






Prior "Actual - Due" 0.231*** 0.230***
(0.0167) (0.0231)
Reminder*Prior "Actual - Due" -0.0826*** -0.124***
(0.0223) (0.0296)
Social*Prior "Actual - Due" 0.00652 -0.0519
(0.0237) (0.0320)
Late*Prior "Actual - Due" -0.0715**
(0.0302)
Penalty*Prior "Actual - Due" -0.0910***
(0.0319)
Constant 0.375** 4.878 0.157 4.410
(0.146) (4.102) (0.151) (3.688)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Library FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.166 0.139 0.162 0.136
Number of users 14442 13990 12205 11750
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.2511 0.5425 0.11 0.8073
H0: Reminder=Late (p-value) 0.0533 0.9048
H0: Reminder=Penalty (p-value) 0.386 0.2485
H0: Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.8328 0.2953
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.144 0.6429
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty=0 (p-value) 0.1102 0.1673
H0: Reminder=Social=0 (p-value) 0.325 0.0163
H0: Reminder*Comp=Social*Comp (p-value) 0.3199 0.0001 0.1253 0.013
H0: Reminder*Comp=Late*Comp(p-value) 0.0384 0.0513
H0: Reminder*Comp=Penalty*Comp(p-value) 0.2092 0.2506
H0: Late*Comp=Penalty*Comp (p-value) 0.3987 0.5104
H0: Reminder*Comp=Social*Comp=Late*Comp=Penalty*Comp (p-value) 0.2049 0.069
H0: Reminder*Comp=Social*Comp=Late*Comp=Penalty*Comp=0 (p-value) 0.2832 0.0007
Notes: This table reports differential treatment effects with respect to prior compliance. Prior Late measures the user-specific proportion of items that were returned late in the pre treatment period. Prior "Actual - Due" measures
the average number of days between the return date and the due date per user in the pre treatment period. The full set of controls is used, as well as the library fixed effects. See the notes from previous tables. Robust standard
errors in paranthesis. *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. 
Control-Reminder-Social Control-Reminder-Social-Late-Penalty
TABLE 9
Differential Treatment Effect with respect to Prior ComplianceProp. Late "Actual - Due" Date Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reminder 0.0103 -0.0647 -0.0221** -0.617** -0.0160 -0.554* 0.00960 0.544
(0.0207) (0.634) (0.00965) (0.261) (0.0136) (0.291) (0.0283) (0.658)
Social -0.0183 -0.458 -0.0192** -0.358 -0.0257* -0.896*** 0.0136 1.199*
(0.0210) (0.644) (0.00951) (0.257) (0.0136) (0.292) (0.0282) (0.655)
Constant 0.491* -0.299 0.374 11.87* 0.268 -1.455 0.297 -1.039
(0.268) (11.25) (0.269) (6.202) (0.234) (5.520) (0.794) (6.801)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Library FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.144 0.115 0.158 0.131 0.158 0.187 0.231 0.276
Number of user 1969 1877 8325 8039 3486 3418 662 656
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.1729 0.5384 0.7689 0.3156 0.4786 0.2457 0.8846 0.3111
H0: Reminder=Social=0 (p-value) 0.3874 0.7439 0.044 0.0595 0.1626 0.0083 0.8847 0.1859
Cross-Equation Joint Tests (p-values) Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date
H0: Reminder equal across age groups 0.4276 0.5174
H0: Social equal across age groups 0.7763 0.1821
TABLE 10
Treatment Effects by Age Groups
Age below 20 Age 20-40 Age 40-60 Age over 60Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Reminder 0.00779 -0.796 -0.0343*** -0.558 -0.0106 -0.641 -0.0486 -0.275
(0.0316) (0.997) (0.0128) (0.359) (0.0204) (0.458) (0.0525) (1.285)
Social -0.0254 -2.272** -0.0241* -0.278 -0.0390* -0.731 -0.0782 1.296
(0.0322) (1.004) (0.0127) (0.356) (0.0205) (0.459) (0.0513) (1.251)
Late 0.0195 -1.416 -0.0328*** -0.397 -0.0177 -0.466 -0.107** -0.733
(0.0314) (0.991) (0.0126) (0.352) (0.0207) (0.467) (0.0496) (1.213)
Penalty 0.00236 -2.216** -0.0456*** -0.555 -0.0480** -1.184** -0.0877* -0.531
(0.0314) (0.991) (0.0126) (0.355) (0.0206) (0.462) (0.0511) (1.251)
Constant -0.0151 -2.664 0.154 10.66** 0.528 -5.538 -2.334 -58.65
(0.267) (8.162) (0.225) (4.874) (0.339) (9.654) (3.754) (91.07)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Library FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.132 0.122 0.159 0.135 0.155 0.171 0.254 0.271
Number of users 1416 1331 7770 7473 2609 2540 410 406
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.307 0.1482 0.4261 0.4313 0.1652 0.8437 0.5725 0.2205
H0: Reminder=Late (p-value) 0.7132 0.5401 0.9099 0.6476 0.735 0.7098 0.2533 0.7151
H0: Reminder=Penalty (p-value) 0.8647 0.1601 0.3707 0.9935 0.0712 0.2422 0.4654 0.8441
H0: Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.587 0.4239 0.3031 0.6497 0.1492 0.1293 0.6946 0.8688
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.5592 0.4117 0.3953 0.8298 0.2312 0.4686 0.7188 0.3277
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty=0 (p-value) 0.7228 0.1156 0.0058 0.4999 0.1134 0.1405 0.2438 0.4837
Cross-Equation Joint Tests (p-values) Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date
H0: Reminder equal across age groups 0.4989 0.9895
H0: Social equal across age groups 0.7738 0.0893
H0: Late equal across age groups 0.1714 0.7127
H0: Penalty equal across age groups 0.3788 0.2711
Notes: The table reports treatment effects for different age groups. Page 1 of the table encompasses users in treatments Control-Reminder-Social, analogue to Table 5, and page 2 of the table corresponds to late users in treatments Control-Reminder-Social-Late-
Penalty, analogue to Table 6. The full set of controls is used, as well as the library fixed effects. See the notes from previous tables. Robust standard errors in paranthesis. *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. 
Age under 20 Age 20-40 Age 40-60 Age over 60
TABLE 10 (continued)
Treatment Effects by Age GroupsProportion Late "Actual - Due" Date Proportion Late "Actual - Due" Date
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Reminder -0.00770 -0.255 -0.0200 -0.302
(0.00945) (0.250) (0.0134) (0.368)
Social -0.0207** -0.255 -0.0345*** -0.169





Male 0.00132 0.0613 -0.00120 0.382
(0.0102) (0.270) (0.0144) (0.394)
Reminder* Male -0.0141 -0.497 -0.00885 -0.721
(0.0145) (0.382) (0.0203) (0.557)
Social*Male 0.00552 -0.363 0.0110 -0.874





Constant 0.375** 4.618 0.156 4.014
(0.146) (4.107) (0.150) (3.695)
Controls  YES YES YES YES
Library FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.166 0.138 0.161 0.135
Number of users 14442 13990 12205 11750
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.1689 0.9998 0.2812 0.7191
H0: Reminder=Late (p-value) 0.9244 0.5444
H0: Reminder=Penalty (p-value) 0.0395 0.0944
H0: Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.0462 0.0211
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.1278 0.0909
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty=0 (p-value) 0.0061 0.0882
H0: Reminder=Social=0 (p-value) 0.0818 0.4946
H0: Reminder*Male=Social*Male(p-value) 0.1746 0.7253 0.3294 0.7839
H0: Reminder*Male=Late*Male(p-value) 0.8217 0.5183
H0: Reminder*Male=Penalty*Male(p-value) 0.3566 0.1491
H0: Late*Male=Penalty*Male (p-value) 0.2451 0.0347
H0: Reminder*Male=Social*Male=Late*Male=Penalty*Male (p-value) 0.5036 0.1643
H0: Reminder*Male=Social*Male=Late*Male=Penalty*Male=0 (p-value) 0.6721 0.1213
H0: Reminder*Male=Social*Male=0 (p-value) 0.3763 0.4016
Table 11
Control-Reminder-Social Control-Reminder-Social-Late-Penalty
Notes: The table reports the differential treatment effect with respect to gender. Male is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 in case of male, and 0 in case of female. The full set of controls is used, as well as the library
fixed effects. See the notes from previous tables. Robust standard errors in parantheses *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. 
Differential Treatment Effect by GenderSpain Northern-Central Europe West-South Europe English Speaking Eastern-Russia Latin America Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Reminder -0.0111 -0.00536 -0.00472 -0.123** 0.0915 -0.0254 -0.0666
(0.00839) (0.0550) (0.0315) (0.0558) (0.0677) (0.0180) (0.102)
Social -0.0148* -0.0456 0.00147 -0.207*** -0.0164 -0.0227 0.101
(0.00834) (0.0564) (0.0310) (0.0544) (0.0661) (0.0178) (0.0869)
Constant 0.260*** 0.411*** 0.280*** 0.294** 0.182* 0.308*** -0.0764
(0.0131) (0.111) (0.0816) (0.116) (0.101) (0.0311) (0.147)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.152 0.126 0.190 0.261 0.226 0.167 0.413
Number of users 10395 265 745 224 185 2369 84
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.6576 0.4673 0.8416 0.145 0.0958 0.8786 0.0674
H0: Reminder=Social=0 (p-value) 0.1803 0.6758 0.9787 0.0008 0.2093 0.3006 0.1596
Spain Northern-Central Europe West-South Europe English Speaking Eastern-Russia Latin America Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Reminder -0.373* -0.320 -0.708 -1.536 -1.367 -0.418 -0.546
(0.216) (1.138) (0.907) (2.002) (1.784) (0.513) (1.983)
Social -0.348 0.331 -0.271 -5.488*** -2.503 0.113 1.923
(0.215) (1.175) (0.896) (1.959) (1.700) (0.507) (1.705)
Constant 1.128*** -1.086 2.929 5.396 3.961 1.627* -7.904***
(0.327) (2.435) (2.310) (4.047) (2.442) (0.863) (2.664)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.125 0.169 0.192 0.124 0.136 0.112 0.396
Number of users 10091 256 721 216 178 2284 82
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.9083 0.5692 0.6206 0.0586 0.5061 0.2899 0.1679
H0: Reminder=Social=0 (p-value) 0.1537 0.85 0.7322 0.0184 0.3405 0.541 0.306
Cross-Equation Joint Tests (p-values) Prop. Late "Actual-Due" Date
H0: Reminder: (1)=(2)=...=(7) 0.3439 0.9874
H0: Social: (1)=(2)=...=(7) 0.0401 0.0216
"Actual - Due" Date
TABLE 12
Treatment Effects by Nationality (Treatments Control-Reminder-Social)
Proportion LateSpain Northern-Central Europe West-South Europe English Speaking Eastern-Russia Latin America Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Reminder -0.0184 0.0258 0.0133 -0.224*** 0.0315 -0.0401* -0.206*
(0.0123) (0.0669) (0.0407) (0.0690) (0.0868) (0.0236) (0.111)
Social -0.0253** -0.0150 0.0139 -0.295*** -0.0788 -0.0256 -0.0211
(0.0122) (0.0681) (0.0393) (0.0684) (0.0825) (0.0233) (0.100)
Late -0.0290** 0.0840 -0.0156 -0.186*** 0.0615 -0.0108 -0.207**
(0.0121) (0.0669) (0.0396) (0.0659) (0.0820) (0.0235) (0.0994)
Penalty -0.0427*** 0.0263 -0.0463 -0.245*** -0.0659 -0.0111 -0.280***
(0.0122) (0.0710) (0.0387) (0.0662) (0.0825) (0.0233) (0.104)
Constant 0.274*** 0.299 0.217** 0.444*** 0.112 0.361*** 0.0430
(0.0172) (0.184) (0.0927) (0.124) (0.115) (0.0366) (0.141)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.144 0.261 0.195 0.286 0.273 0.156 0.519
Number of users 8198 241 778 230 195 2308 79
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.5771 0.542 0.9874 0.3284 0.1812 0.526 0.0762
H0: Reminder=Late (p-value) 0.3868 0.3648 0.4713 0.5823 0.7142 0.2024 0.9899
H0: Reminder=Penalty (p-value) 0.0494 0.9949 0.1281 0.7649 0.229 0.205 0.4926
H0: Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.2634 0.4005 0.4192 0.3804 0.0966 0.9886 0.4617
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.2495 0.513 0.3404 0.4623 0.1869 0.5271 0.0455
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty=0 (p-value) 0.0105 0.6246 0.4845 0.0002 0.3028 0.4686 0.0178
Spain Northern-Central Europe West-South Europe English Speaking Eastern-Russia Latin America Asia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Reminder -0.413 0.750 0.174 -6.450*** -2.588 -0.797 -1.796
(0.332) (1.764) (1.082) (2.341) (2.457) (0.689) (2.344)
Social -0.343 2.613 0.138 -8.512*** -4.938** -0.373 2.943
(0.332) (1.792) (1.051) (2.333) (2.298) (0.679) (2.104)
Late -0.638* 3.497** -0.0316 -7.432*** -1.902 0.605 -1.128
(0.329) (1.748) (1.060) (2.239) (2.294) (0.683) (2.079)
Penalty -0.823** 2.547 -1.331 -7.085*** -5.103** -0.0294 -2.397
(0.331) (1.861) (1.040) (2.219) (2.317) (0.684) (2.157)
Constant 1.676*** 0.0302 -1.796 12.88*** 3.520 2.639*** -5.836**
(0.428) (5.358) (2.456) (4.090) (2.960) (1.008) (2.813)
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.112 0.182 0.206 0.166 0.198 0.130 0.442
Number of users 7902 237 747 217 184 2222 78
H0: Reminder=Social (p-value) 0.8333 0.2919 0.9723 0.4045 0.3164 0.522 0.0337
H0: Reminder=Late (p-value) 0.5006 0.107 0.8453 0.6784 0.7716 0.0354 0.7716
H0: Reminder=Penalty (p-value) 0.2208 0.3335 0.1445 0.7911 0.2823 0.2501 0.793
H0: Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.5761 0.5954 0.1977 0.8795 0.1428 0.3384 0.5347
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty (p-value) 0.4617 0.4398 0.3817 0.8641 0.3634 0.1894 0.0361
H0: Reminder=Social=Late=Penalty=0 (p-value) 0.1299 0.2526 0.5274 0.0015 0.1475 0.3041 0.0694
Cross-Equation Joint Tests (p-values) Prop. Late "Actual-Due" Date
H0: Reminder: (1)=(2)=…=(7) 0.0905 0.1302
H0: Social: (1)=(2)=…=(7) 0.0256 0.001
H0: Late: (1)=(2)=…=(7) 0.0938 0.003
H0: Penalty: (1)=(2)=…=(7) 0.0355 0.0064
Notes: The table reports treatment effects for different groups of nationalities.The first page encompassesthe users in treatments Control-Reminder-Social,analogueto Table 5 and the second page correspondsto the usersin
treatments Control-Reminder-Social-Late-Penalty, analogue to Table 6. Robust standard errors in parantheses *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. 
TABLE 12 (continued)
Treatment Effects by Nationality (Control-Reminder-Social-Late-Penalty)
Proportion Late

















Library FE YES YES
R-squared 0.0449 0.092
Number of users 59367 25591
H0: Nationality groups equal 0 0.0014
H0: Nationality groups equal=0 0 0
TABLE A.1
Prop. of Late Returns for Different Nationality Groups
Notes: The table reports proportion of late returns per user for different groups of nationalities.
The omitted variable is Spaniards. Column (1) refers to the pre-treatment period and column (2)
to the post-treatment period. Full set of controls is used. Robust standard errors in parantheses
*: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Reminder -0.00797 -0.469** -0.00221 -0.309
(0.0112) (0.218) (0.0230) (0.336)
Social -0.0112 -0.372* -0.0308 -0.390





English 0.149*** 3.579*** 0.183*** 6.264***
(0.0386) (0.999) (0.0504) (1.370)
Reminder*English -0.117** -1.543 -0.184** -5.626***
(0.0574) (1.494) (0.0751) (2.050)
Social*English -0.195*** -4.892*** -0.255*** -7.623***





Prior Late 0.319*** 0.277***
(0.0173) (0.0277)
Prior "Actual - Due"  0.209*** 0.193***
(0.0191) (0.0264)
Reminder*Prior Late -0.0124 -0.0343
(0.0247) (0.0393)
Social*Prior Late -0.0158 0.00553
(0.0246) (0.0393)
Reminder*Prior "Actual - Due"  -0.0571** -0.0933***
(0.0258) (0.0340)






Late*Prior "Actual - Due"  -0.0503
(0.0347)
Penalty*Prior "Actual - Due"  -0.0816**
(0.0379)
Constant 0.332 3.382 0.164 -0.333
(0.208) (5.707) (0.215) (6.254)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Library FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.161 0.137 0.156 0.131
Number of users 10619 10307 8428 8119
TABLE A.2
English Speaking Countries compared to Spain
Notes: The table reports differential treatment effects for users from the English speaking countries. The reference group is Spaniards (omitted).
Interaction terms for differential treatment effects for users in the English speaking countries are shown. Interaction terms for differential treatment
effects based on the behavior prior to the treatment are included. Full set of controls, as well as library fixed effects are included. See the notes from
previous tables. Robust standard errors in parantheses *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date Prop. Late "Actual - Due" Date
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Reminder -0.00642 -0.471** 0.00319 -0.310
(0.0112) (0.216) (0.0232) (0.334)
Social -0.0113 -0.373* -0.0297 -0.396





UKA-USA -0.0374 -1.393 0.0860 -0.246
(0.0746) (1.888) (0.0974) (2.580)
Reminder*Asia -0.110 -0.759 -0.267* -2.578
(0.105) (2.699) (0.141) (3.808)
Social*Asia 0.124 2.217 -0.00630 1.402





Prior Late 0.320*** 0.283***
(0.0174) (0.0280)
Prior "Actual - Due" 0.204*** 0.191***
(0.0191) (0.0265)
Reminder*Prior Late -0.0180 -0.0452
(0.0249) (0.0396)
Social*Prior Late -0.0162 0.00391
(0.0248) (0.0397)
Reminder*Prior  "Actual - Due" -0.0564** -0.0940***
(0.0255) (0.0338)






Late*Prior  "Actual - Due" -0.0422
(0.0352)
Penalty*Prior  "Actual - Due" -0.0763**
(0.0378)
Constant 0.329 3.295 0.158 -0.454
(0.208) (5.657) (0.215) (6.216)
Controls YES YES YES YES
Library FE YES YES YES YES
R-squared 0.159 0.137 0.155 0.131
Number of user 10479 10173 8277 7980
TABLE A.3
Asia compared to Spain
Notes: The table reports differential treatment effects for Asian users. The reference group is Spaniards (omitted). Interaction terms for
differential treatment effects for Asia are shown. Interaction terms for differential treatment effects based on the behavior prior to the treatment are
included. Full set of controls, as well as library fixed effects are included. See the notes from previous tables. Robust standard errors in
parantheses *: significant at the 10% level; **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 1% level. 